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Abstract
The recent coronavirus disease (COVID-19), caused by SARS-CoV-2, is inarguably the most challenging coronavirus
outbreak relative to the previous outbreaks involving SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV. With the number of COVID-19 cases
now exceeding 2 million worldwide, it is apparent that (i) transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is very high and (ii) there are
large variations in disease severity, one component of which may be genetic variability in the response to the virus.
Controlling current rates of infection and combating future waves require a better understanding of the routes of
exposure to SARS-CoV-2 and the underlying genomic susceptibility to this disease. In this mini-review, we highlight
possible genetic determinants of COVID-19 and the contribution of aerosol exposure as a potentially important
transmission route of SARS-CoV-2.
Genomics of susceptibility and resistance
How individuals respond to SARS-CoV-2 exposure is
becoming better understood in a global sense, but differ-
ences in the vulnerability of individuals to infection and
in the spectrum of COVID-19 symptoms remain to be
understood. It is known that advanced age and pre-
existing conditions (e.g., cardiovascular, pulmonary, and
renal diseases) render a person more vulnerable to the
more severe health consequences of COVID-19 [1].
However, a surprising observation emanating from the
pandemic is the rate of hospitalization of younger, osten-
sibly healthy individuals.
What makes some people more vulnerable than others
to SARS-CoV-2? What role do gene networks play in
determining or influencing efficiency of infection, the
immune response to infection, or the severity of
COVID-19 symptoms? For example, genetic
polymorphisms exist in the ACE2 gene [2], which en-
codes the cellular receptor for SARS-CoV-2; allelic vari-
ants of the ACE2 may influence the protein’s binding
with the virus [3] and subsequent invasion of the cell. In
addition, polymorphisms of cellular proteases—believed
to facilitate the entry of SARS-CoV-2 into the cell, along
with furin [4] and TMPRSS2 [5]—have been shown to
exist [6, 7]. Indeed, a recent preprint suggests that
TMPRSS2 variants and resulting expression may influ-
ence COVID-19 severity [8]. It is now evident that not
all infected patients develop a severe respiratory illness;
the reason for this is currently not clear. Moreover, very
little is understood about interindividual genetic differ-
ences in the immune response to this new and novel
version of the old coronavirus. A possible association be-
tween the genetic variability in histocompatibility com-
plex (MHC) class I genes (human leukocyte antigen
[HLA] A, B, and C) and the susceptibility to SARS-CoV-
2 and severity of COVID-19 has recently been suggested
[9]. Specifically, the HLA-B*46:01 gene product is pre-
dicted to exhibit the lowest binding capacity to SARS-
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CoV-2 peptides, suggesting individuals with this allele
may be more vulnerable to COVID-19—due to reduced
capacity for viral antigen presentation to immune cells.
Conversely, the authors identified that the HLA-B*15:03-
encoded protein is predicted to have the greatest cap-
acity to present highly conserved SARS-CoV-2 peptides
that are shared among common human coronaviruses
[9]—suggesting patients possessing this HLA genotype
may be more likely to develop immunity. Finally, during
some viral infections (including HIV), the ADF/cofilin
complex (ADF, actin-depolymerizing factor, is encoded
by the DSTN gene; cofilin is encoded by CFL1 and CFL2
genes) is activated. In the initial stages of viral infection,
hyperactivation of cofilin and inefficient actin
polymerization is known to occur [10]. The possible im-
plication of allelic variants in the DSTN, CFL1, and
CFL2 genes, as well as the ACE2 gene, with the
spectrum of clinical phenotypes of COVID-19, is there-
fore intriguing and warrants further exploration.
What makes some SARS-CoV-2 infected individuals
extremely sensitive to the development of acute re-
spiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) while others are
asymptomatic. In this day and age of next-generation
sequencing, perhaps groups of 500 or 1000 age- and
gender-matched patients could have their entire ge-
nomes sequenced, and then sophisticated genetic
analysis software programs could home in on single-
nucleotide variant (SNV) differences in possibly rele-
vant genes or genomic regions in the afflicted (highly
sensitive) and the asymptomatic (highly-resistant)
groups.
Our understanding of genetic susceptibility to SARS-
CoV-2 infection and the severity of COVID-19 is still in
its infancy. The scientific community is trying to address
this issue by combining research efforts using existing
genetic databases. An important step in this direction is
the COVID-19 Host Genetics Initiative, created by Mark
Daly and Andrea Ganna from the Institute for Molecular
Medicine Finland (FIMM); this initiative is intended to en-
courage the human genetics community to generate,
share, and analyze data to elucidate the genetic determi-
nants of COVID-19 susceptibility, severity, and outcomes
(https://www.covid19hg.org/). So far, this initiative shows
promise because major biobanks (e.g., FinnGen) have
expressed a willingness to participate [11]. In addition to
this initiative, the UK Biobank—which contains samples
from 500,000 volunteers and detailed information about
their health—has now started to curate data from
COVID-19 patients (https://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/2020/
04/covid/).
In Iceland, the company deCODE Genetics has moni-
tored the spread of the virus using SARS-CoV-2 gen-
omic analysis [12] and has partnered with Iceland’s
government to sequence the genomes of viral hosts, i.e.,
patients who were previously infected with COVID-19
(https://www.decode.com/). The Greek government has
recently funded an initiative, COVID-19-GR, to geno-
type 3500 COVID-19 patients, whole-genome sequence
their SARS-CoV-2 genome, and perform immunoge-
nomic analyses. All of these data will be linked with de-
tailed clinical information collected in the Greek
COVID-19 registry (http://www.gsrt.gr/central.aspx?sId=
119I428I1089I646I488772). In the USA, Harvard’s Wyss
Institute researchers and the Personal Genome Project
at Harvard University are launching a project to com-
pare the genomes, microbiomes, viromes, and immune
systems of consenting individuals with extreme COVID-
19 susceptibility and individuals that exhibit resistance
(https://wyss.harvard.edu). Finally, the Yale SARS-CoV-2
Genomic Surveillance Initiative is sequencing the gen-
ome of SARS-CoV-2 in order to monitor the spreading
of the virus in Connecticut (https://covidtrackerct.com/).
In addition to the genomics research, attention needs
to be paid to the spread of the virus and how it can be
prevented. Below, we therefore review the latest on
transmission of SARS-CoV-2.
Understanding the impact of airborne coronavirus
on transmission
The transmission efficiency of SARS-CoV-2 has proved
to be high, with reported reproductive numbers greater
than that of the 2009 H1N1 influenza virus [13, 14]. The
routes of exposure that have led to this high transmissiv-
ity have been the subject of considerable discussion, not-
ably the contribution of aerosol transmission. As with
any infectious respiratory disease, an infected individual
can release aerosols and droplets containing SARS-CoV-
2 by coughing or sneezing [15–18]. Similar to what we
know about influenza A and B, MERS-CoV, and SARS-
CoV-1, these virus-containing aerosols and droplets can
lead to short-range airborne transmission (~ 6 ft) [19,
20]. Such aerosols (< 10-μm diameter) and droplets (>
10-μm diameter) can promote infection through (i) de-
position on surfaces [21] and subsequent hand-to-
mouth/nose/eye transfer and (ii) inhalation. While sus-
pended airborne droplets can persist in the air for sev-
eral minutes, the smaller aerosols do not rapidly settle
and can persist for longer durations (~ minutes to hours)
[22]. Once airborne, the characteristics of aerosols gen-
erated by cough or sneeze are dynamic, notably decreas-
ing in size due to evaporative loss of water depending on
ambient humidity and temperature levels [23, 24]. As
the size of aerosols decrease, their ability to disperse in
the air is enhanced. Therefore, inhalation of aerosol-
borne SARS-CoV-2 is likely to be a relevant mode of
viral infection, with the range of aerosol transmission ex-
tending beyond 6 ft of an infected individual.
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Routes of aerosol generation
Beyond coughing and sneezing, normal speech and
breathing can also generate aerosol. The size of aerosol
generated by speaking and breathing is similar, ranging
from 0.75 to 1.1 μm, but is notably smaller than those
generated by coughing or sneezing, i.e., ~ 5 μm [25].
Prior studies that collected exhaled breath condensate
from influenza patients have demonstrated that this re-
spiratory virus could be emitted just by breathing [26].
The small size of aerosols released through this route
potentially extends their range of travel. The concentra-
tion of aerosol released by the combination of speaking
and breathing for more than 4min is equivalent to the
amount of aerosol emitted for 30 s of singing or cough-
ing [15, 27, 28]. The volume of speech can further influ-
ence aerosol release, leading to variations in emission
rates between individuals that may impact their capacity
for viral transmission [25]; this is relevant, in particular,
for infected individuals that are pre-symptomatic or have
asymptomatic illness. Transmission of aerosol generated
through these routes over short distances has been sup-
ported by recent case studies of family clusters in vari-
ous Chinese cities [29, 30], a restaurant setting in
Guangzhou, China, [31] and a choir group in Mount
Vernon, WA, USA [32]. In addition, droplets or aerosols
deposited on floors and surfaces can become resus-
pended by human activity, and resuspended particles
can comprise the majority of the aerosols within an oc-
cupied setting [33, 34].
Cases of airborne SARS-CoV-2 detection
Over the past weeks, three recent studies conducted in
Wuhan, China, [35]; Singapore [36]; and Omaha, NE,
USA [37], have reported SARS-CoV-2 detection in in-
door air samples. These studies sampled air with active
samplers that used a pump to draw air through a filter
or into a cylindrical chamber where airborne material
was collected. However, they all used different sampling
systems, which further varied by the sampling flow rates,
collection times, and sizes of aerosol sampled. Using
quantitative RT-PCR, airborne levels of viral RNA were
found in rooms of COVID-19 patients. Virus was de-
tected in the air sampled from the rooms of symptom-
atic, as well as asymptomatic, patients. Interestingly,
levels of airborne SARS-CoV-2 in these patients’ rooms
decreased as their illness progressed. In the Wuhan hos-
pital study, the authors suggested that in addition to dir-
ect emission, resuspension of viruses from droplets
deposited on personal protective equipment (PPE) or
flooring was a source of SARS-CoV-2 aerosols [35].
While these initial reports suggest SARS-CoV-2 can be
detected in the air, it is important to acknowledge the
small sample sizes of these studies, as well as those lack-
ing appropriate controls.
Airborne SARS-CoV-2 RNA was also detected in hall-
way spaces outside patients’ rooms [37] and in medical
staff areas of the hospital, i.e., changing rooms, office
spaces, and PPE removal rooms [35]. Concerningly, con-
centrations measured in the medical staff areas often
exceeded those found in the patient rooms. In addition,
the virus-containing aerosols in the sampled air of the
medical staff areas were smaller in size (peak concentra-
tions appearing in the submicron (0.25 to 1 μm) and
supermicron (> 2.5 μm) ranges) than those in patient
rooms (1 to 4 μm and > 4 μm [36]). Identifying SARS-
CoV-2 in a range of aerosol size fractions raises further
questions about the deposition profile of the virus in the
lung. It is well established that larger aerosols (> 4 μm)
are predominantly deposited in the upper and central
airways (i.e., nasopharynx, tracheobronchial) and are
subject to mucociliary clearance. In contrast, deposition
in the deep lung (i.e., alveoli), having epithelial cells rich
in ACE2 [38], is enhanced for smaller aerosols (< 4 μm),
thereby potentially facilitating its transmission efficiency.
Some indoor public spaces tested in Wuhan, China,
were found to have detectable levels of SARS-CoV-2, in-
cluding the hospital pharmacy and department stores
[35]. Airborne levels of the virus in these public spaces
were comparable to concentrations detected in hospital
patient workspace areas but lower than measurements
in medical staff areas.
Disease transmission by SARS-CoV-2 aerosols
Detection of SARS-CoV-2 in indoor air of hospitals and
public spaces raises several questions: What is the ability
for this airborne form of the virus to transmit disease
(i.e., is the virus viable)? And how do measured viral
concentrations in the air (which, to date, have been only
accomplished through PCR-based approaches) relate to
an infectious dose?
The premise of aerosol transmission necessitates that
the virus remains viable in the air. As viability decreases
over time, it is important to understand the rate of in-
activation under different environmental conditions, e.g.,
temperature and humidity [39]. In recent laboratory test-
ing, aerosolized SARS-CoV-2 remained viable for up to
~ 3 h [21] when tested at a relative humidity of 65%. In-
activation studies suggested that survival on surfaces,
and in the air, may be further enhanced at relative hu-
midities of less than 50% [40]. These results are consist-
ent with other airborne viruses—including SARS-CoV-1
[21, 41], influenza H1N1 [42, 43], and MERS-CoV [44–
46], which also show evidence of airborne transmission.
Viability of SARS-CoV-2 in aerosol collected from real-
world air samples, however, has not yet been fully ex-
plored. Only one of the three studies that detected
SARS-CoV-2 in hospital air examined the viability of the
virus. No evidence of viral propagation was found for air
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samples collected at the University of Nebraska Medical
Center [37]. This negative result may be attributable to
low airborne levels of the virus [47], but it is also feasible
that the air sampling methods used may have contrib-
uted to reduced viability of the sampled virus. In Neb-
raska, air samples were collected at a stationary indoor
location on gelatin filters at a flow rate of 50 L/min for
15 min. Air sampling parameters, such as flow rate, in-
fluence virus detection and viability [47]. It is critical
that air sampling methods for infectious virus do not
compromise the integrity of the viral envelope because
this would reduce or eliminate infectivity and contribute
to false negatives.
Detection of SARS-CoV-2 in the air prompts questions
about safe exposure levels. The high transmissivity of
the virus suggests that a low dose might be sufficient to
infect an individual; however, such studies have yet to
evaluate the infectious dose of SARS-CoV-2. Until scien-
tific evidence emerges, it is useful for individuals to fol-
low approaches that minimize their risk of infection by
reducing their exposure level and duration of exposure.
Initial studies (as detailed above) report a range of air-
borne virus exposure levels in hospitals, as well as public
spaces. The combined use of masks and physical distan-
cing can be effective approaches for decreasing exposure
to airborne forms of SARS-CoV-2. Avoiding or minimiz-
ing the time in contact with these potential aerosol ex-
posures would also be a critical parameter in lowering
risk.
Preventing new infections
An inherent difficulty associated with the airborne route
of transmission is that the measures used to reduce air-
borne exposure can be laborious and are not fail-proof.
Common approaches for mitigating airborne exposures
include (i) identification of emission sources, (ii) preven-
tion of viral shedding and inhalation exposure, and (iii)
environmental controls. The topic of environmental
controls leverages evidence of reduced exposures by im-
proving ventilation [48], utilization of portable filtration
devices [49], or other aerosol inactivation technologies,
and cleaning practices to reduce exposure from resus-
pension [50]. The topic of environmental controls is
broad and complex. Therefore, we defer to guidance
prepared by the American Society of Heating, Refrigerat-
ing and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASRHAE) and
other recent papers focused on indoor ventilation and
environmental controls [51, 52].
Identification of emission sources: personal exposure
assessment
Viral shedding by an individual has been suggested to
be greatest immediately following infection, prior to
onset of symptoms [53]. Unfortunately, current testing
protocols require most individuals to have developed
multiple symptoms of COVID-19 in order to qualify
for testing, after which a confirmed diagnosis can be
made. Monitoring airborne levels of SARS-CoV-2 may
be an alternative method for identifying exposure hot-
spots and could be used to alert individuals, at in-
creased risk of infection, to practice self-isolation
measures. Such exposure testing might be conducted
at fixed indoor locations of particular concern, such
as sites with vulnerable individuals (e.g., nursing
homes) or high activity (e.g., groceries stores). Wear-
able air sampling equipment is also available and can
be used to assess personal SARS-CoV-2 exposure. For
example, at the University of Nebraska Medical Cen-
ter, personal exposure samples were collected from
individuals in direct contact with COVID-19 patients
(who had experienced no cough at the time of sam-
pling) [37]; the viral levels measured on personal de-
vices were found to be higher than those taken at a
stationary site in the patient’s room. It is, however,
important to appreciate that only two personal expos-
ure samples were evaluated in this study. Understand-
ing an individual’s exposure to airborne forms of the
virus and their potential for infection may circumvent
further exposures across a community.
Prevention of viral shedding and inhalation exposure:
effective face coverings
A range of face coverings is available—including N95
respirator masks, surgical masks, and cloth coverings,
each offering different efficiencies for inward protection
(i.e., PPE) and outward protection (i.e., source control)
from virus-laden aerosol and/or droplets. For inward
protection of the individuals wearing the masks, the
gold-standard N95 masks are capable of filtering > 99%
of airborne aerosols; this is in contrast to filtration effi-
ciencies of surgical masks (~ 75%) and cloth coverings
(~ 67%) that afford inward protection against for aero-
sols sized between 0.02 and 1 μm [54, 55]. For outward
protection of other individuals from the individual wear-
ing the mask, the N95 has been shown to prevent ~ 70%
of aerosols (0.2 to 1 μm) generated by coughing and then
from being released. On the other hand, surgical masks
and cloth masks leaked ~ 50% and ~ 90%, respectively,
of the same emissions [54, 55]. Face coverings have been
recommended by many public health agencies inter-
nationally with the aim of preventing new infections. Be-
cause the supply of surgical and N95 masks are limited
such that available resources are prioritized for health
care providers, the general public has been recom-
mended to use homemade cloth face covering to miti-
gate exposure of healthy individuals and prevent release
of aerosolized virus shed from infected individuals [56].
With the increased use of cloth masks, it is important to
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recognize their limitations and to consider design modi-
fications for improvement. Notably, the filtration effi-
ciency (for inward or outward protection) of a cloth face
covering varies by the type of material used [57, 58]. Use
of a single-ply thin fabric (such as cotton, silk, or linen)
has a relatively low capacity for capturing submicron (<
1 μm) virus-laden aerosol. Materials such as vacuum
cleaner bags (made of heavy, dense, random-fiber orien-
tation material) have demonstrated a barrier to aerosol
transport that is similar to surgical masks. In addition to
the choice of material, the loose fit of homemade cloth
masks may also contribute to poor filtration efficiency.
This issue is most important in children. Ensuring this
age group is well protected through proper fit of cloth
face coverings is critical given the high prevalence of
asymptomatic cases reported in children [59]. While
promoting the use of face coverings by the public, it is
also essential to ensure cleaning protocols prior to reuse,
and to reinforce the importance of continued physical
distancing to prevent individuals from having a false
sense of security.
Conclusions
The contribution of aerosol exposure to the transmission
of SARS-CoV-2 has been the subject of recent intensive
debate. Whereas the World Health Organization has dis-
missed this mode of transmission [60], scientists have em-
phasized that infected individuals represent emission
sources of aerosol generated by routine behaviors—such
as breathing, speaking, singing, coughing, sneezing, and
resuspension activity—all of which might be capable of
transmitting disease [61, 62]. Because the short history of
the COVID-19 pandemic has been marred by large
amounts of misinformation, it becomes critically import-
ant to provide a definitive answer to the question as to
whether or not the disease is transmitted by aerosol. This
requires the development, standardization, and dissemin-
ation of optimal techniques for sampling airborne SARS-
CoV-2. Such techniques are essential for the adoption of
proven strategies that limit exposure to SARS-CoV-2 and
will likely decrease new cases and protect the population,
when the pandemic wanes and return-to-work strategies
are being implemented.
The possibility of a second wave of SARS-CoV-2 infec-
tions is very real; hence, preventive measures are import-
ant. It is noteworthy that vaccines against respiratory
syncytial virus (RSV), rhinoviruses, SARS-CoV-1, and
MERS-CoV have not yet been successful. Thus, for
SARS-CoV-2 (and these other viruses), the medical and
scientific communities must intensify their studies in the
areas of drug development for discovery of efficacious
therapies and in preventive measures. Prevention would
include avoidance of viral contamination, as well as
possible identification of genetically susceptible sub-
groups within the human population.
Looking forward and in the context of this journal, the
genomics of susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 infection, as
well as the wide variation in clinical response to
COVID-19 in patients, should become active areas of in-
vestigation. Variations in COVID-19 severity might be
classified as (a) asymptomatic, (b) symptomatic but no
hospitalization required, and (c) severely symptomatic
with hospitalization urgently indicated. Elucidation of al-
leles of relevant genes associated with these three levels
of severity to viral response might aid clinicians in deal-
ing with possible future waves of this pandemic. Elucida-
tion of genomics and genetic pathways related to
susceptibility of SARS-Cov-2 infection could also be-
come important in combating a future wave. Results
from such studies are therefore of great interest to this
journal; therefore, we at Human Genomics strongly en-
courage future submissions in these areas of genomics
and genetic pathways.
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